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Abstract 
The past twenty years have seen the gradual creation of both an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ and a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ since the 1992 Treaty on European Union. More 
recent is the development of a ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ over the past ten years. All three of 
these policies involved the navigation and negotiation of security, borders and governance in and by 
the European Union (EU). This article analyses these practices of bordering and governance through 
a five-fold security framework. The article argues that a richer understanding of EU security 
discourses can be achieved through bringing the five dimensions to the analysis and using them to 
study both the interlinking and the interweaving of security, bordering and governance. Overall, the 
analysis presented here suggests that the five dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, 
practice and being can all contribute to a more expansive understanding of how EU security in the 
2000s has been related to bordering and governance processes, and how these have been 
increasingly interwoven within the EU.  
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INTRODUCTION: INSERTING SECURITY IN THE EU 
The past twenty years have seen the gradual creation of both an ‘Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ (AFSJ) and a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) within the EU. While 
both Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and CFSP were reserved as intergovernmental areas of 
cooperation in the 1992 Treaty on European Union, the 1990s saw a gradual emergence of 
consensus that member state cooperation was insufficient to the demands of the post-Cold 
War world.2 The ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) has developed as a response to the 
need to institutionalise relations with those neighbouring states who have no immediate 
possibility for membership. Article 8 of the 2010 Lisbon Treaty committed the EU to 
“develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of 
prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised 
by close and peaceful relations based on cooperation”. 
 
While it is possible to treat these three policy areas of AFSJ, CFSP and ENP separately, it is 
also clear that they intersect over the issues of security, bordering and governance in the EU. 
At the same time, these discourses have emerged at the nexus of Europeanisation and 
globalisation as the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the EU become more indivisible. The article uses 
the insertion of ‘security’ in the EU as an analytical strategy to understand how policies of 
bordering and governance are seen and read differently through five dimensions of security. 
For this reason the word ‘security’ is bracketed in the title to reflect the analytical questions 
and strategy of inserting security into the EU. Hence the article considers the European 
[security] Union at the nexus of the security, bordering and governance processes of these 
three policy areas.  
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As suggested, the insertion of security into the EU has occurred through three areas of 
practice involving freedom, security and justice policies; bordering and neighbouring 
policies; and internal governance policies and attempts to promote ‘good governance’ and 
‘good global governance’ through external policies. The main vehicles for these attempts to 
secure Europe have been the practices and policies found in the AFSJ, ENP, and CFSP areas. 
But CFSP also involves Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), while the cross-cutting 
EU Counter-Terrorism (EUCT) response, and the Lisbon Treaty reforms both impact on all 
three areas. This insertion of security does not occur within a discursive vacuum; EU 
practices of bordering and governance all interweave regional integration and globalisation 
processes. These discursive practices will be analysed through a framework consisting of five 
dimensions of security: broadening, deepening, thickening, practices, and being. Within each 
of these dimensions, EU policy discourses will be drawn on to illustrate how each dimension 
has impacted on notions of bordering and governance. The method used in the article is 
comparative in the sense that it compares the five dimensions across the three policy areas 
of security, bordering and governance; broadly represented by JHS/AFSJ (including elements 
of counter-terrorism); ENP; and CFSP/CSDP. The method uses a discourse analysis of EU 
policy evolution over time, looking for examples of “discursive nodal points”.3 The analysis 
places the starting emphasis on security, but then seeks to examine how security becomes 
discursively related to borders/bordering and governance/governing in EU policy agendas. 
These discursive relations include interlinking of discourses of security, bordering and 
governance where concepts and issues in one area give meaning to another. Going further, 
discursive relations can also include interweaving where “discourses are bound up with each 
other” and “held together by nodal points” which makes it very difficult to separate different 
policy agendas.4 
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The framework uses the terms broadening and deepening from Keith Krause and Michael 
Williams and the notion of thickening from Jef Huysmans to provide three dimensions.5 The 
addition of the terms practices, used to describe practices of ‘securitisation’ and ‘de-
securitisation’, and being (meaning form and nature) to discuss subject/object and 
existential/ontological distinctions, provides two further dimensions with which to 
interrogate the EU. In each of these dimensions EU discursive strategies of security, 
bordering and governance will be briefly examined to illustrate the inter-woven 
consequences of securing Europe in a better world. The article concludes with a reflection 
on the merits of inserting a security framework into the study of EU bordering and 
governance. 
 
As the article will illustrate, EU security policies and discourses have tended to either be 
analysed within the confines of one particular theoretical school or approach; or analysis has 
tended to be focused on one particular policy area. Largely missing from these accounts are 
attempts to draw on different schools/approaches, or longer-timescale analyses of the 
interlinking and interweaving of the three policy areas. The article argues that a richer 
understanding of EU security discourses can be achieved through bringing the five 
dimensions to the analysis and using them to study both the interlinking and interweaving of 
security, bordering and governance. Overall, the analysis presented here suggests that the 
dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, practice and being can all contribute to a 
more expansive understanding of how EU security in the 2000s has been related to 
bordering and governance processes, and how these have been increasingly interwoven 
within the EU.  
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BROADENING SECURITY 
The notion of broadening the agenda of those engaged in the study of security emerged 
during the 1980s in response to three related, but separate critiques from the ‘peace 
movement’, the ‘post-positivist movement’, and from within the ‘academic community’.  
Growing out of the anti-nuclear, anti-war, the then anti-arms race campaigns of the 1950s to 
1980s, the peace movement advanced the critique that the study of traditional or 
conventional security was part of the problem, not the solution.6 Over a similar period the 
post-positivist movement with its critiques of knowledge and scientism also led many to 
challenge the whole notion of security as being anything other than a discursive 
performance.7 Finally, parts of the academic community began to argue the need to broaden 
the research agenda, led by Buzan and Ullman.8 The trend in EU studies followed this 
broadening in the early 1990s, with studies of migration (Huysmans 1995), non-military 
security (Manners 1996), Schengen (Anderson and Bort 1997), and territory (Tunander et al 
1997).9 This EU trend accelerated greatly in the 2000s with development of AFSJ and the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aspects of CFSP.10 
 
Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify four breadths to the broadening of security - 
military security, post-Cold War security, insecurity, and security performance. The 
traditional or conventional breadth of security is the focus on military force, as found 
dominant in the 1980s. These old conventions included the study of ‘national security’, 
‘nuclear deterrence’, ‘security dilemmas’, and ‘military strategy’ and are still found fiercely 
debated in leading U.S. journals such as International Security. Conversely, there has been an 
increasing emphasis on military force in EU studies.11  
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The post-Cold War breadth of security was to be found in the threats and studies of 
international security studies which became the new conventions in the 1990s. These 
conventions included “… broadening the agenda to new threats - adding economic, societal, 
political and environmental risks to the classically dominant military threats”.12 In EU studies 
“the end of the Cold War division of Europe led to changes in the security environment 
[which] changed the way in which security was considered and Europe redefined".13 The 
third breadth of study is that of insecurity -  finding its way into ‘mainstream’ academic 
thinking in the 2000s with a focus on discussions of social insecurity, the role of globalisation 
and development, the ‘rebirth’ of nationalist movements, transnational terrorism, and other 
groups or collectivities which thrive on insecurity. In EU studies, ‘insecurity studies’ include 
work in Freedman on gender and migrant women, and Huymans on migration and asylum.14 
 
The broadest width of security is that of arguing that security is best understood as a 
political performance of invoking and interpreting danger for self benefit, as suggested by 
the Copenhagen School of international security studies.15 In EU studies the work of 
Higashino and Karyotis all use the Copenhagen School approach.16 This broadening of the 
agenda of threats and issues draws analytical attention to the extent to which securing, 
bordering and governance discourses broaden the policy agenda in these three areas. Thus, 
when analysing the broadening of these EU policy agendas the focus is on discourses which 
widen the range of threats and issues of concern beyond Cold War assumptions of ‘state 
security’. 
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This broadening of security is strongly reflected in the discursive practices of the EU as 
found, for example, in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the keystone of 
subsequent EU securing, bordering and governance policies.  
 
The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal 
and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, 
the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and 
prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration 
and injustice.17 
 
The ESS links together borders and security, internal and external, freedom and prosperity, 
frustration and injustice. It also identifies five “key threats” of terrorism, proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime.18 Thus 
the ESS mixes a post-Cold War emphasis on new threats with an emphasis on non-state 
threats and insecurity caused by globalisation. In this respect the ESS illustrates discursive 
practices that developed from the late 1990s onwards of broadening security by linking to 
issues of borders and governance, stating for example: “Even in an era of globalisation, 
geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are 
well-governed”.19 This last sentence also shows how, in the early 2000s, “European interest”, 
bordering and governance were considered important to “secure Europe in a better world”. 
 
By adopting a ‘broadening security’ approach it is possible to see how the 2000s have been a 
period marked by a broadening of the agenda of interrelated issues linking securing, 
bordering and governance in the EU. This broadening became clearer with the May 2001 
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Commission White Paper on Europe’s Contribution to World Governance, written prior to 
11th September, that suggested “promoting global governance as a means of achieving the 
core objectives of sustainable development, security, peace and equity”.20 However, while 
the involvement of EU member states in military interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq), as 
well as counter-terrorist policies became the analytical centre of attention, the broadening 
bordering discourses of JHA and ENP and the broadening governance discourses of CFSP and 
External Actions are potentially more important. This was becoming apparent by 2003 as the 
ESS set out how “increasingly open borders” mean that “the internal and external aspects of 
security are indissolubly linked”.21 Possibly the clearest illustration of this broadening agenda 
linking securing, bordering and governance was to be found in the “solidarity clause” 
enshrined in the 2010 Lisbon Treaty. The clause aimed to “protect democratic institutions 
and the civilian population from any terrorist attack”, invoking a ‘spirit of solidarity’ in the 
protection of democratic institutions – the centrepiece of member state governance.22 
 
What the ‘broadening security’ approach illustrates is that the 2000s saw a period of 
broadening the agenda of threats and issues which linked together both internal and 
external concerns, as well as securing, bordering and governance. While the growth of 
globalisation discourses in the 1990s perhaps made such broadening inevitable, the 
perceived need to establish an ENP in 2003-2004, the terrorist attacks of 2001-2005, and the 
drive to re-establish effective multilateralism at the UN all contributed to the interweaving 
of EU security, borders and governance discourses and policies both internally and 
externally. In order to realise what this interlinking and interweaving of discourses meant for 
the EU it is important to move to the second dimension of inserting and analysing security in 
the EU. 
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DEEPENING SECURITY 
While the broadening of security focuses on debates over what threats and issues to study, 
the deepening of security is concerned with the units of analysis, as Huysmans puts it: a 
deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects, that is, units receiving threats 
- adding individuals, ecological system, community, etc. to the traditional state-centric 
agenda.23 
 
Although this deepening of security is confusing because it mixes analytical units, such as 
objects (physical) and subjects (human), it is a discussion which proceeds in three steps. 
Firstly, the traditional or conventional unit of analysis was primarily the ‘nation-state’ with 
the focus on discussions of national security. In parallel with this were discussions of how the 
nation-state could achieve security and order in conditions of ‘international anarchy’. Thus 
prior to the 1990s, the traditional depth of security studies was the national/international 
with its focus on states and the inter-state system. The increasing depth of security studies 
in the 1990s was to look beyond the state/state system for sources of international threat. 
Most explicitly, the Copenhagen School introduced the idea that there were five depths to 
security: international systems, international subsystems, units, subunits, individuals.24 This 
deepening of the agenda by introducing new referent objects focuses analytical attention on 
the extent to which security, bordering and governance discourses deepen the policy agenda 
in these three areas. Thus, when analysing the deepening of the EU security, bordering and 
governance policy agendas the emphasis is on discourses which include more units of 
analysis beneath the Cold War prominence given to the state. 
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In EU studies, the importance of the ‘multilevel political system’ introduced in the 1980s by 
Carole Webb (1983) and Brigid Laffan (1983), mirrored this concern for different depths of 
analysis from the EU level through member state level to regional and local levels.25  To take 
one example, deeper analyses of security seek to go beyond state security studies to focus 
instead on ‘human security’ and its concerns for economic and social issues including threats 
to health (such as the AIDS pandemic), food security (such as high staple costs caused by 
biofuels), and minimum economic wellbeing (such as poverty being the world’s greatest 
source of insecurity). Within the EU, the development of human security as a component of 
external actions has been widely advocated and discussed since the mid-1990s.26 The 1994 
UNDP Human Development Report introduced the ‘New Dimensions of Human Security’ 
when it argued that human security equated ‘security with people rather than territories, 
with development rather than arms’.27 By 2005 the European Commission had placed 
human security at the centre of development assistance by arguing that the EU ‘must 
respond to the full range of threats afflicting the most vulnerable in societies across the 
world - hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity’.28 The 
role of the Javier Solana’s ‘study group’ on Europe’s security capabilities and its 2004 report 
‘A Human Security Doctrine for Europe’, as well as the work of the group’s convenor Mary 
Kaldor, all emphasise the promotion of human security by the EU.29  
 
The deepening of security is an increasingly important element of the discursive practices of 
the EU with examples seen in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS (RIESS) and 
the 2011 EU Priorities for the 66th Session of the GA of the UN: 
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We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, 
promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing 
the root causes of conflict and insecurity.... We need to continue mainstreaming human 
rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based 
approach coherent with the concept of human security.30  
 
The EU will continue to promote the concept of Human Security as a comprehensive, 
integrated and people centred approach in addressing interrelated threats to security, 
livelihood and dignity of people and vulnerable communities.31 
 
Both the 2008 RIESS and the 2011 EU priorities illustrate how this deepening of security 
reaches down beneath the level of state concerns to address ‘the root causes of conflict and 
insecurity’ with an emphasis on ‘comprehensive, integrated and people centred approach’.32 
This interlinking of development and conflict concerns in the human security discourses of 
the EU has accelerated since 2004, particularly in the context of EU relations with the UN. 
For example, EU priorities for the 2005, and 2009-2012 sessions of the UN General Assembly 
have all included references to the promotion of human security. This EU deepening of 
security all involves a broadening of security discourses to include issues of poverty and 
inequality, livelihood and dignity of people and vulnerable communities. Such deepening 
also illustrates discursive practices of linking to issues of bordering and governance, for 
example by referring to the importance of border management and border missions, as well 
as good governance.33 
 
Adopting a ‘deepening security’ approach makes it clear that the 2000s have been marked 
by a deepening of the EU’s emphasis on linking security, bordering and governance beyond 
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the state towards new referent objects such as people rather than territories. Similar to 
‘broadening’, the Commission’s 2001 White Paper also argued that ‘democracy is essential 
to governance’ and that ‘the danger of privatising and therefore eroding democracy clearly 
exists ... [as a] democratic risk’.34 This deepening of referent objects within the state, such as 
democracy and privatisation, also became a means of linking deeper security to democratic 
governance. From the terrorist attacks of 2001-2005 onwards, the deepening of security 
discourses to include ‘citizens’ and ‘peoples’ of the EU also identified threats to democratic 
societies and the need to develop an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’.35 But this 
deepening discourse also drew in EU security, bordering and governance relations with 
referent objects outside of the EU. Hence, the newly renamed ‘Instrument for Stability’ 
referred to the EU ‘technical and financial assistance in pursuit of .... the security and safety 
of individuals’ in a third country or countries.36 
 
Thus the ‘deepening security’ approach illustrates how the 2000s witnessed a deepening of 
the EU policy agendas by introducing new referent objects which, like the ‘broadening’ 
agenda, further linked together both internal and external issues, as well as security, 
bordering and governance. Clearly this linking of security and governance, both within EU 
democratic societies, and within the AFSJ is not unproblematic, as questionable practices 
such as increased surveillance within and along borders illustrate. Thus while broadening 
discourses interwove AFJS, ENP and CFSP from 2001-2003 onwards, deepening discourses 
moved the central referent object from EU member states to EU citizens, with all the 
potentially-negative consequences for non-EU states and non-EU citizens. To more fully 
appreciate the significance of this shift it is necessary to go beyond broadening and 
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deepening the agenda of EU policy analysis towards the third dimension of inserting and 
analysing security in the EU.  
 
 
THICKENING SECURITY 
Although both broadening and deepening security calls into question the focus on threat 
and threatened, the debate over the thickening of security raises the question of the 
methodology of analysis. Huysmans has argued that there are three methodological 
thicknesses to the analysis of security, with differing qualitative results: “…the difference 
between the three approaches demonstrates that there is a growing degree of 
sophistication if one moves from definition to concept to thick signifier”.37 
 
His first thickness is that of using a ‘security definition’ approach synonymous with most of 
the study of security within the field - ‘[i]n a definition one attempts to sketch the general 
essence of a category, in this case the essentials of security’.38 Here EU studies generally 
defines European security as being either internal security associated with AFSJ or external 
security related to CSDP - compare Walker or Henderson with Howorth.39 A greater 
thickness is to be found in approaches which engage in a ‘conceptual analysis’ involving both 
the study of security and the study of the field of security studies – “[i]t does not 
concentrate meaning in a single statement but explores more extensively what characterizes 
a security policy or debate”.40 Examples in the study of the EU would include here the work 
of Van Ham and Medvedev; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite; and Mérand.41 Huysmans’ thickest 
approach suggests that an approach which engages in an analysis of security as a ‘thick 
signifier’ yields the most sophisticated and qualitatively valuable methodology – 
14 
 
“interpreting security as a thick signifier brings us to an understanding of how the category 
‘security’ articulates a particular way of organizing forms of life2.42 Work on the EU from this 
perspective includes the debates over the c.a.s.e. collective Manifesto;43 as well as more 
recent work on ‘critical border studies’.44 The thickening of the method of analysis from 
definition to concept to thick signifier brings analytical attention to the relative emphasis 
placed on sketching out the essentials of security; studying the security field; or 
understanding how the ‘security’ category affects wider society. Thus, when analysing the 
thickening of the EU security, bordering and governance policy agendas the focus is on 
discourses which reflect an understanding of how the categorisation and analysis of policies 
affects wider society. 
 
The question of thickening security is not easily identifiable within the discourses of the EU 
institutions and policies agendas because of its methodological implications. However, there 
are a multitude of examples of the need to escape from short-term, narrowly-focused 
analysis towards more holistic or comprehensive understandings of the challenges facing the 
EU and other global actors, for example: 
At the global level, a very high proportion of discourse reflects an assumption that the 
interests of each territorial actor are a self-centred given and that international relations 
is the advancement of these fixed and selfish interests, with others’ interests being 
pursued only as and when this can be key to maximising our own well-being. This sort of 
statement, if repeated often enough, can insert into a state’s identity, or idea of its 
interests, the notion of a sustained state commitment to upholding the international 
rule of law.... [General incoherence in policymaking] is exacerbated by a lack of 
analytical tools for producing a more holistic view of the world: incoherent policies 
result which often work against each other.45  
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This statement, and the many others referring to the need for a holistic or comprehensive 
view of policy-making practices, reflect “a comprehensive or holistic approach to security” 
first seen in the ESS.46 Aspects of such a move from a definitional to conceptual to signifying 
understanding of security can be read through the numerous references to the roots, root 
causes, or complex causes of insecurity found in the documents. Two examples of these 
discursive practices can be found in discussions of “the most recent wave of terrorism is 
global in its scope .... [i]t arises out of complex causes”;47 and “the phenomenon of human 
trafficking is especially relevant in this area. It is important to ensure that crime control / 
security and human rights are understood as complimentary dimensions of the same issue, 
and that the root causes of trafficking are also addressed”.48 What is notable in both these 
examples is that the thickening of security explicitly involves bordering and governance 
practices, whether in addressing the complex causes of terrorism or the root causes of 
human trafficking. This discourse towards thickening security can be found in the most 
recent EU policy agenda towards the UN claiming a broad, long-term and holistic 
understanding of security placing prevention at the heart of the EU approach: “we 
understand security in a broad, holistic manner. Preventing threats from becoming sources 
of conflict early on is at the heart of our approach”.49 
 
Taking a ‘thickening security’ approach motivates inquiry into the extent to which EU policy 
discourses and their analysis appear to reflect the interlinkage of security, bordering and 
governance in a self-consciously reflexive way. Two brief examples serve to illustrate how 
interpreting the three areas as thick signifiers provides insight into their intertwining. The 
first example involves the contrasting discourses regarding humanitarian intervention and 
the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by EU member states, particularly after the unsanctioned 
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invasion of Iraq in April 2003.50 Both the September 2003 Commission Communication and 
the December 2003 ESS centred on discourses of ‘effective multilateralism’ in the 
governance of humanitarian intervention. Such discourses were strengthened in the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty and the 2010 Lisbon Treaty: “The Conference ... stresses that the 
European Union and its Member States will remain bound by the provisions of the Charter of 
the United Nations and, in particular, by the primary responsibility of the Security Council 
and of its Members for the maintenance of international peace and security”.51 The second 
example involves the tensions inherent in the post-11th September formulations and 
discourses of the ENP, particularly between ‘shared values’ versus ‘stability and security’.52 
The critical rethinking of ENP in light of the Arab uprisings of 2011, led to a discursive shift 
and new emphasis on civil society and sustainable democracy.53 
 
The ‘thickening security’ approach illustrates how the 2000s can be characterised by moves 
from defining to conceptualising to thickening security, bordering and governance 
discourses. EU institutional biases are towards more comprehensive and holistic discourses, 
although these are clearly challenged by member state preferences in areas such as counter-
terrorist security, southern European bordering, and global governance. What also seems 
clearer is that thickening approaches bring us closer to understanding for whom and how 
the interweaving of these discourses will appear illegitimate, even threatening. To better 
understand who may be threatening or threatened by such discourses, it is necessary to 
adopt a fourth dimension based on the practice of security. 
 
PRACTICE OF SECURITY 
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Breadth, depth and thickness are all important, yet largely static, dimensions of the study of 
security. The innovation of the Copenhagen School was to introduce dynamic notions of 
securitisation and desecuritisation.54 Christou, Croft, Ceccorulli and Lucarelli have taken 
these ideas further to suggest that security practices go beyond (de)securitisation to include 
security logics such as (de)politicisation.55 What these practices of security do is to reinforce 
the idea that security is not an objective condition or stasis - it is a subjective process or 
dynamic - security in this context is a movement. The first security movement is that of 
‘securitisation’ – “meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring 
emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure”.56 If securitisation is a movement from normal politics to abnormal politics then 
‘desecuritisation’ is a movement in the other direction – “the shifting of issues out of 
emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”.57 The 
absence of movement from politicisation to securitisation (or vice-versa) has been described 
as ‘asecurity’, which does not necessarily imply an absence of movement – “Asecurity can 
always take two forms: either it signifies the absence of securitizations, …or it is asecurity 
only within a specific sector, such as the military one, and prompts the move of security into 
other fields”.58 Christou et al suggest that it is also possible to consider both the 
politicisation and depoliticisation of security as practice beyond the limits of 
(de)securitisation.59 The security practice approach focuses the analysis on an understanding 
of security as a subjective process characterised by dynamic movement of the political and 
policy agenda. Thus, when analysing the practice of EU security, bordering and governance 
policy agenda movements the focus is on discourses which shift the debate out of or into the 
normal political sphere. 
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The 2000s saw an extraordinary grown in scholarship arguing that the EU has engaged in 
some form of securitisation.60 But recent critics of securitisation have also argued that a 
more informed and nuanced understanding of EU security and non-security policies is 
needed.61 Examples of this latter approach include the work of Stoian and Stefanova on the 
EU as a de-securitiser,62 as well as work on EU member states and (de)securitisation by Diez 
and Squire, and Colás.63 Despite these studies and debates, there is a working assumption in 
much literature that everything the EU does is securitisation, whether it is security, 
bordering, or governance policies.  
 
By analysing EU discursive practices in counter-terrorist, ENP, AFJS, and Internal Security 
policy areas, it is possible to identify emergent relationships both between security and 
politics; and between borders, security and governance. In the first respect the tense 
relationship of extraordinary security and normal politics can be seen between combating 
terrorism and respecting human rights in the EU Counter-Terrorist Strategy;64 between 
guaranteeing security and respecting fundamental rights in the Stockholm Programme;65 and 
between internal security and fundamental rights in the Internal Security Strategy.66 Thus 
while many state-based securitisations took place in the 2000s including, for example, 
extraordinary renditions,67 EU institutions discursively sought to maintain a balance between 
security and rights. 
 
In the second respect the interlinkage between security, bordering and governance can be 
seen between economic development, stability and governance across the borders in the 
2007 attempt to reform ENP;68 and between democracies, economic growth and cross-
border links in Catherine Ashton’s New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood.69 While it is 
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entirely plausible that such discursive practises are for popular consumption rather than 
implementation, there is a clear discursive interweaving taking place both prior to, and after 
the Arab uprisings. But what is interesting is the discursive shift away from the emphasis on 
stability and security, and towards democracy support, economic issues, and cross-border 
cooperation. 
 
In summary, while EU discursive practises in the 2000s have contributed to securitisation of 
certain policy agenda, there is a question of who security is for – who is the intended 
audience of securitising/desecuritising speech acts? And how does securitisation link 
together security, borders and governance?? These questions can be answered in a number 
of ways, to take just three examples focused on democracy, war, and individuals.  During the 
period of intense securitisation within EU member states in the early- to mid-2000s, there is 
consistent evidence of EU discourses seeking to position normal democratic politics rather 
than securitise internal and external policies in the extraordinary realm. To illustrate, both 
the Counter-Terrorism Strategy links security to democratic societies,70 while the Instrument 
for Stability seeks to assist democracy in third countries when threatened.71 At the same 
time, EU institutional discourses sought to avoid the US securitising discourse of ‘war on 
terror’ and ‘state security’ by speaking of “counter-terrorism” and “safety of individuals”. To 
illustrate, the 2006 Instrument for Security spoke of “the security and safety of individuals” 
outside the EU,72 while the 2006 Counter-Terrorism Strategy states that as a security threat 
“terrorism is criminal” rather than an act of war.73 Finally, by the late 2000s EU securitising 
and descuritising discourses further shifted away from the state and towards the individual. 
To illustrate, both the 2008 Review of the Implementation of the ESS and the 2009 
Stockholm Programme suggested that security must “meet the expectations of our citizens” 
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and “respond to a central concern of the peoples”.74 These discursive practices suggest that 
both securitising and desecuritising moves are present in the EU, and also serve the function 
of linking security discourses to those of bordering third countries and governing democracy. 
 
 
‘BEING’ SECURE 
The fifth security dimension is that of ‘being’ - whether we are discussing a form of life (i.e. a 
person) or an organisation of life (i.e. a state) and whether we are talking about the 
existence (i.e. life/death) or nature (i.e. understanding of life) of being. This discussion of 
‘being security’ is not as metaphysical as we might think for it involves distinguishing 
between the subjects or objects of security, as well as the type of security these 
subjects/objects experience. In terms of the subject/object distinction, studies in 
international relations tend refer to ‘referent objects’ understood as “things that are seen to 
be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”.75 In contrast, 
sociological studies prefer to refer to ‘referent subjects’ understood as “the human 
individual, who is the proper focus, and can be the only subject, of security policy”.76 This 
distinction is important because of the role of subjectivity and objectification in the study of 
security as Ken Booth and Lene Hansen have made clear.77 
 
Secondly, in terms of existential/ontological distinction studies in international relations 
tend to refer to ‘existential security’ understood as the survival of “a designated referent 
object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and 
society)”.78 Again in contrast, sociological studies refer to ‘ontological security’ understood 
as “confidence or trust that the natural worlds are as they appear to be, including the basic 
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existential parameters of self and social identity”.79 This distinction is important because 
although the existential security of referent subjects/objects may be achieved, the “forces of 
liberalisation and modernisation [may] produce social and economic dislocation as well as 
personal uncertainty and insecurity” which could threaten ontological security thereby 
motivating violence and conflict.80 Thus ‘being secure’ involves the achievement of 
ontological security, whether amongst conflict groups,81 or amongst European diplomats.82 
The ‘being secure’ approach draws analytical attention to the extent to which it is possible to 
distinguish between subjective/objective and existential experiences in the security, 
bordering and governance discourses in the EU. Thus, when analysing the ‘being’ discourses 
of these three EU policy agendas the focus is on discourses which suggest subjectivity or 
objectification, and/or existential or ontological experiences. 
 
This final dimension of analysis presents a central challenge for the EU to achieve security in 
a sustainable fashion, which ensures peace rather than securitisation, and highlights the 
need to ensure ontological security among those implicated in European integration. A 
number of scholars have examined ontological security in Europe, including work on the EU 
(Manners 2002), peace studies (Roe 2008), security communities (Adler and Greve 2009).; 
and political psychology (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking 2011).83 Since 2003, existential and 
ontological concerns have increasingly co-existed alongside each other in the discourses of 
the EU’s external actions. The European Commission’s 2003 The EU and the UN: The choice 
of multilateralism suggested that both EU and UN multilateralism should address issues at 
the “intersection of the development and security agendas”.84 In parallel, Javier Solana’s 
2003 ESS stated that “security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, 
development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda”.85 These 
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two examples illustrate the discursive construction of EU existential and ontological security 
concerns lying at the intersection or nexus of development and security policies. 
Interestingly, a similar discourse was to be found in the UN Secretary General’s 2005 Report 
“In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’: ‘we will not 
enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and 
we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are 
advanced, none will succeed”.86 
 
Following these EU and UN discourses, the 2005 European Consensus on Development, 
further wove together existential and ontological concerns by saying that “without peace 
and security development and poverty eradication are not possible, and without 
development and poverty eradication no sustainable peace will occur”.87 Similarly, in 
humanitarian crisis assistance the 2006 “Instrument for Stability” sets out how stable 
conditions for human and economic development, and peace, security and stability co-exist 
as both ontological and existential concerns. The Council conclusions of the November 2007 
meeting on Security and Development reiterate this discursive linking to the level of a 
mantra: “the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2005 European Consensus on 
Development acknowledge that there cannot be sustainable development without peace 
and security, and that without development and poverty eradication there will be no 
sustainable peace”.88 
 
By the time of the 2008 review of the ESS, EU discourse linking the security and development 
nexus in this way had become almost standardised, following exactly the language of the 
European Consensus: “As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have 
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acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and 
without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace”.89 The 
Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the 2009 EU Report on Policy 
Coherence for Development identified this discourse: “no one questions anymore the 
importance of security for development and the role that development plays for preventing 
conflicts, ensuring durable exits from conflicts and for accompanying crisis management 
through protective, confidence-building and crisis-alleviating measures. The security 
development nexus has been firmly established in the EU’s political priorities”.90 Finally, the 
second revision of the Cotonou Agreement between the 79 countries from Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) countries and the EU in 2010 reinforced the discourse: “the 
Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no 
sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no 
sustainable development”91  
 
In sum, the ‘being secure’ approach illustrates how the 2000s has seen the discursive 
interlinkage between existential and ontological concerns found at the nexus of 
development and security issues strengthen. Equally important, the approach encourages 
asking subjective/objective questions about who or what is being secured, bordered or 
governed? As some of these brief illustrations of EU external actions show, the security-
development nexus is also important in terms of existential-ontological ‘being’. Furthermore 
the discursive construction of the security-development nexus has implications for the 
bordering and governance of targeted third-countries. While the security-development 
nexus discourse is primarily targeted at ACP states, as we have seen over the past decade of 
ENP, there are also bordering implications for neighbouring third countries. Thirteen 
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neighbouring states are recipients of OECD-DAC development assistance, the largest being 
Turkey, Serbia and Ukraine. Similarly, seven Mediterranean ENP states are also recipients of 
OECD-DAC development assistance, the largest being Palestine, Egypt and Morocco. During 
2000-2005 development assistance to most of these neighbouring countries had shifted 
from the economic to the social sector, primarily focussed on government and civil society.92 
Hence by 2005 the EU security-development nexus discourse was likely to be having a direct 
consequence through the development assistance strategies targeted at government and 
civil society in the EU’s 20 neighbouring countries – an illustration of the interweaving of 
existential and ontological experiences in the security, bordering and governance of third 
countries. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: SECURITY, BORDERING AND GOVERNANCE 
The article has developed five dimensions of security in order to offer differing perspectives 
capable of making sense of EU security, bordering and governance. Each of the five 
dimensions included a conceptualisation and operationalisation of the dimension, as well as 
a brief reflection on the EU’s discursive practices and what they mean for the interactions 
between security, bordering, and governance. The analytical focus of each discussion was on 
the discursive agendas and techniques intended to secure the EU from regional and global 
concerns as they emerged throughout the 2000s. 
 
Although each dimension was only able to briefly capture and illustrate small aspects of 
much larger undercurrents of EU strategies and policies, they do provide a means of 
inserting security analysis into the study of the EU which is increasingly compartmentalised 
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in highly specific policy fields such as JHA/AFSJ, ENP or CFSP/CSDP. The discussion of 
broadening security looked at the widening of the EU agenda of what threats and issues to 
study. What that analysis showed was the way in which the post-Cold War agenda of 
globalisation in the 1990s became interrelated with that of post-11th September concerns 
with terrorism in JHA/AFSJ, as well as post-2004 issues of ENP relations with the EU’s 
neighbourhood. The discussion of deepening security looked at the development of the EU 
agenda of new referent objects to study. In this analysis the 2000s witnessed the 
development of the concept of human security as a means of moving the focus of concern 
beyond the state and towards more human concerns. 
 
The discussion of thickening security looked at the consequences of moving the method of 
EU policy analysis from definition to concept to thick signifier. In this third illustrative 
analysis the 2000s where characterised by an increasing thickening of both the EU 
understanding of the policy agenda and the method of analysing this agenda, leading to a 
broader, more long-term and more holistic understanding of EU security, bordering and 
governance discourses. The discussion of the practice of security identified the 
consequences of understanding security as a more dynamic, subject process than had 
previously been assumed. Here the analysis looked at the tensions between securitising and 
desecuritising dynamics and discourse of EU policies in the age of the US ‘war on terror’. 
Finally the discussion of ‘being secure’ looked at ways of distinguishing between 
subject/object and existential/ontological EU policy experiences. In this final illustrative 
analysis discourses of sustainable peace at the security-development nexus were briefly 
considered in order to understand how EU security, bordering and governance processes 
were constructed in both the neighbourhood and in relations with developing countries.  
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These five analyses suggest that the dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, 
practice and being can all contribute to a more expansive understanding of how EU security 
in the 2000s has been related to bordering and governance processes, and how these have 
been increasingly interwoven within the EU. Furthermore, the five dimensions illustrate how 
security, bordering and governance have been increasingly interwoven by the EU in 
multilateral settings. The five dimensions thus provide a means of understanding and 
rethinking the complex and multilayed EU policy agenda in the interstices of globalising, 
multilateralising and multipolarising international policy processes. However, what these 
lines of reasoning also suggest is that for those implicated in the EU, the discursive practices 
of security, bordering and governance are both interrelated and contingent on the context 
of neighbouring peoples, freeing mobilities, and global struggle, as seen in the Arab 
uprisings. In this sense the analytical approach of this European [security] Union situates 
security, bordering, and governance in a deeply interdependent global context. Here then lie 
the many potential contradictions of the deeply interdependent patterns of security, 
bordering and governance at the nexus of this European [security] Union.  
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